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This study investigates why conflict of interest occurs in multi-bi ODA – a hybrid form of bilateral 
ODA and multilateral ODA – and focuses on the bilateral relations between donor countries and 
multilateral organizations for analysis. Significantly, donor countries and multilateral organizations 
can each have their respective interests due to the hybrid nature of multi-bi ODA, and consequently, the 
relationship of donor countries and multilateral organizations is not always cooperative and mutually 
beneficial in multi-bi ODA. In Particular, this study focuses on the reason why conflict arises in multi-
bi ODA based on the ‘Principal-Agent Model’ to analyze the conflict-based relationship of donor 
countries and multilateral organizations.
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1. IntroductIon
Since Official Development Assistance (ODA)1 – development financing (also referred 
to as financing for development) contributed by the member countries2 of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) – was developed by the OECD in 1972, the overall size of ODA has gradually 
expanded and large-scale expansion of ODA was observed in the era of MDGs (Millennium 
Development Goals). Since then, the type of ODA has been diversified which includes 
budget support, basket funding, pooled funding, and project-type interventions. However, 
the growth rate of ODA has currently slowed and UN agencies (also generally referred to 
as multilateral organizations in development) have been facing budget constraints since 
donor countries began limiting their spending on ODA. In addition, ODA/GNI has gradually 
declined resulting in diverging gaps between required amount and actual support of ODA 
in development. This originated from a few reasons such as global economic crisis and 
rising pressures from domestic stakeholders3 (OECD, 2010b; OECD 2011a). Further, the 
fact that multilateral organizations heavily depend on the financial contribution from donor 
countries also becomes the reason for the financial limitations of UN agencies engaging in 
* Corresponding author
1 Definition of the OECD: “1) Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or 
by their executive agencies; and 2) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion 
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is 
concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10 per cent).”
2 30 member countries of OECD DAC (as of May 2017).
3 Legislative organizations and civil societies.
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development.  
However, ODA contribution to UN agencies – particularly based on voluntary conditions 
– has expanded even though the incremental curves of overall ODA has been slowed down as 
shown in Figure 1. 
This phenomenon provided a ground for the research on why donor countries have a 
tendency to expand ODA contribution to multilateral organizations at least it is voluntarily 
contributed. In particular, this study focused on multi-bi ODA – which is termed by the 
OECD and delivers bilateral ODA through multilateral organizations – in that 1) it is the 
ODA voluntarily contributed by donor countries and 2) it possesses commonality with multi-
bi ODA. In light of these financial contexts of ODA in development, this study examined the 
underlying reason for the contribution of multi-bi ODA to the revitalization of ODA and its 
implication regarding the relationship between donor countries and multilateral organizations. 
By doing so, this study attempts to analyze the reason why conflict of interest occurs in 
multi-bi ODA – a hybrid from of bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA – and focuses on the 
bilateral relations between donor countries and multilateral organizations for analysis.
To interpret the questions, this study focused on the fact that most of multilateral ODA 
have been delivered into limited numbers of multilateral organizations (i.e. United Nations, 
World Bank Group, EU Institutions, and Regional Development Banks). It is also significant 
that the United Nations remains the entity that receives the majority of the multi-bi ODA. 
Second, taking the insufficient pools of academic material and statistical resource into 
account, this study extensively reviewed and cross-checked the statistics, documents, and 
academic papers of the OECD, UN agencies, and bilateral agencies of donor countries. 
Third, this study conducted focused-group interview and adopted the Principal Agent Model 
to verify the research questions focused on the relationship between donor countries and 
multilateral organizations.
Figure 1. Total ODA and ODA/GNI (1960-2014)
Source: OECD (2015b: 164)
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2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MULTI-BI ODA
From the emergence of ODA in 1970s, there has been continuous discussion on which 
type of ODA facilitates better aid between bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA.4 In general, 
small donor countries have a tendency to prefer multilateral ODA since the cost of project 
management can be costly for them without relevant supports from multilateral organizations. 
On the contrary, large donor countries which have relatively abundant experience, financial 
resources, and overseas networks prefer bilateral ODA since the capabilities of large donor 
countries are enough to independently expedite developmental projects and related activities 
(Fues, 2010: 1-3). 
Regarding the historical context of two different types of ODA, it is notable that 
demand for multilateral ODA has gradually increased due to the globalizing world and 
growing interactions among countries as a consequence. As interactions increase among 
countries in global context, activities of multilateral cooperation have also expanded to 
tackle the increasing global issues. This shifting trend on the growing need for multilateral 
cooperation has encouraged donor countries to strengthen the collaboration with multilateral 
organizations. By this increasing need for multilateral cooperation, donor countries and 
multilateral organizations have contributed to the emergence of a ‘new and hybrid’ type of 
ODA and it was termed multi-bi ODA by the OECD (OECD, 2011a; Sagasti, 2005).
Encompassing both features of bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA, multi-bi ODA (also 
referred to as multi-bilateral ODA) has common interests of donor countries and multilateral 
organizations and this entails either ‘competition or collaboration’ between donor countries 
and multilateral organization. The core feature of multi-bi ODA lies on the fact that multi-
bi ODA5 allows donor countries to 1) decide the themes, sectors regions, and countries prior 
to the ODA commitment and 2) track the records of their ODA contributions by the reports 
of budget allocation of multilateral organizations. This particularly enables multilateral 
organizations to attract ‘easier and bigger’ financial contribution from donor countries since 
multi-bi ODA can help raise ODA visibility for the domestic constituents in donor countries. 
3. SHIFTING TREND OF ODA
3.1. Emergence of Multi-Bi ODA
Since ODA was coined by the OECD, the absolute volume of ODA has continued to rise 
over the past decades. In particular, ODA has considerably expanded in the era of MDGs due 
to a series of high-level international conferences on development financing6 and globally 
4 To date, bilateral ODA accounts for approximately 70% of entire ODA whereas multilateral ODA 
accounts for 30%. Among the entire activities of multilateral cooperation, approximately 40% of 
ODA has been delivered through multilateral organizations including multilateral ODA and multi-bi 
ODA. 
5 Definition of the OECD: “contributions to multilateral organizations that are earmarked at any level 
– to a specific country, region, sector or theme.” Multi-bi ODA is reported as part of donors’ bilateral 
ODA (OECD, 2011a).
6 International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002.
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agreed development goals (i.e. MDGs and EFA7). 
On the contrary, ODA as a share of GNI (ODA/GNI) has gradually decreased and the 
decrease of ODA/GNI was generally originated from the economic downturn and resistance 
from tax payers in donor countries. The historic low of ODA/GNI (0.22%) was observed in 
2001 (OECD homepage) and the decrease of ODA/GNI implies that the preference of donor 
countries for ODA contribution has also continued to decline in that the ODA contribution 
and economic growth of donor countries have respectively gone in an opposite direction.
Nonetheless, 1) rising global issues such as HIV/AIDS, extreme poverty, natural disaster, 
energy, and environment in today’s globalizing world and 2) the 15 years of MDGs have 
boosted the numbers and ranges of ODA activities particularly in multilateral context. 
Besides, on politically sensitive issues such as democracy-building and crisis prevention, 
bilateral donor countries particularly tend to choose multilateral aid since multilateral 
organizations are regarded as being politically neutral in relative terms (Finn Tarp, 2002, 
pp. 28-29; OECD, 2012a). The increased volume of ODA and enhanced complexity of aid 
architectures have made the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid more difficult due 
to the growing numbers of global challenges as well as the addition of new stakeholders in 
the process of international development (Acharya, 2006). These factors, however, also serve 
to underscore the increased importance of multilateral aid, which has been hailed as one of 
the most effective vehicles for coping with these global challenges (OECD, 2011a).8 The 
reasoning behind this evaluation is that multilateral aid has a comparative advantage over 
bilateral aid due to its superiorly skilled workforce, professional expertise, and abundant 
7 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) targeting on 15 years between 
2000 and 2015
8 “Multilateral aid has a vital role to play in responding to global challenges such as food security, 
climate change, and conflict. We have shaped a complex multilateral system with structures to suit 
diverse objectives and subject to responsibility to ensure its effectiveness for the benefit of our 
partner countries,” by J. Brian Atwood (DAC Chair)
Figure 2. Breakdown of Total ODA (2013)
Source: OECD (2015a: 2)
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fieldwork experiences.9
In line with the expansion of ODA funded activities in multilateral context, the entire 
ratio of ODA which is channelled through multilateral organizations – multilateral ODA and 
multi-bi ODA – has also increased. As described in Figure 2, the ratio of multilateral ODA 
and multi-bi ODA accounts for 41% together (as of 2013) and it is almost compatible with 
that of bilateral ODA. This implies that the roles of multilateral organizations have expanded 
in relations with the growing activities of multilateral cooperation. 
In particular, multi-bi ODA has been increasing for the past decades while multilateral 
ODA has turned into a stalemate due to the economic downturn and resistance from domestic 
stakeholders in donor countries (OECD, 2013). Currently, the breakdown of multi-bi ODA 
out of total ODA is found to be between 10% and 20% on average and a few countries have 
shown even higher preference for multi-bi ODA (OECD CRS).10 Due to the nature of multi-
bi ODA, the increase of multi-bi ODA escalated the leverage of donor countries over the 
management of multi-bi ODA and it implies that the chances of conflict between donor 
countries and multilateral organizations have been also increased. 
According to the OECD, multi-bi ODA is defined as “contributions to multilateral 
organizations that are earmarked at any level – to a specific country, region, sector or theme” 
and it is reported as part of donors’ bilateral ODA (OECD, 2011a). In another definition, 
the OECD says that multi-bi ODA includes earmarked contributions to trust funds (TFs), 
joint programmes (JPs), and specific activities within a country programme (OECD, 2012). 
Table 1 shows the examples of multi-bi ODA, and notably, a number of trust funds are being 
managed by the World Bank11 and the United Nations. 
9 For example, many UN agencies have a number of Country Offices (CO) and local staffs in 
developing countries and UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP are the exemplary entities which are particularly 
field-oriented. 
10 The ratio in Sweden and Norway marked over 20% (DAC reports on multilateral aid). In Sweden, all 
multi-bi ODA is determined by the development agency (SIDA), while it is usually the responsibility 
of governmental ministries in other DAC countries (OECD, 2011a). 
11 The World Bank alone manages over 1,000 main trust funds and the UN also has various trust funds 
particularly administered by UNDP (Reinsberg, 2012). 
Table 1. Examples of Multi-Bi ODA Channeled Through Multilateral Organizations
Description Multilateral channel
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Clean Technology Fund
Education For All - Fast Track Initiative
Environment Transformation Fund
Jakarta Multi-donor Trust Fund
DRC Humanitarian Pooled Fund
Law and Order Trust Fund - Afghanistan
Emergency Program in the Horn of Africa








World Food Programme (WFP)
African Development Bank
Source: OECD (2011a: 30)
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3.2. Growth of Non-Core Resources in the United Nations
United Nations (UN), largest international organization working on global issues such as 
sustainable development, food production, climate change, and gender equality, is financed 
by ‘assessed contributions’12 and ‘voluntary contributions.’13 These contributions are defined 
in different terminologies in each of the involved UN agencies and this makes the structures 
of UN finances look seemingly more complex. 
Assessed contributions are mandatory funding contributed from the UN member states 
and they are widely utilized as ‘regular budget resources’ in the entire UN system. Since it is 
used for operating the organization (i.e., operational expenditures, administrative fees), it is 
also termed ‘core resources (United Nations, 2007).’
On the other hand, voluntary contributions are not mandatory, but voluntary funding as it 
is named, and it is also called ‘extra-budgetary resources.’ Besides, voluntary contributions 
are generally regarded as ‘non-core resources’ because donor countries do not favorably 
contribute their aid resources by labeling them as core resources. But in broader context, 
there are also some amounts of core-resources in voluntary contributions as shown in Table 2 
(United Nations, 2007). In general, core-resources are the most pivotal funding to support the 
organizational operations in the United Nation and the organization has recently confronted 
financial limitation due to the imbalance between core-resources and non-core resources 
caused by the decreasing ratio of core-resources compared to the increasing non-core 
resources in recent years.14 
Significantly, core resources (regular budget resources) are also termed ‘unearmarked 
resources’ since the resources are provided without any conditions attached to them. 
Contrarily, non-core resources (extra-budgetary resources) can be replaced by ‘earmarked 
contributions’ for they are earmarked for certain subjects on their disbursement (United 
Nations, 2007). Table 2 shows the general pattern of resource terminologies being used in the 
12 “Assessed contribution finances the regular budgets of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Payment of the assessed contribution is one of 
the legal obligations accepted by a country when it joins the Organization (Browne, 2013).”
13 “Voluntary contributions finance special programs and offices created by the U.N. system, such as the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF). Payment 
of these contributions is entirely up to each individual country; no country is legally obliged to 
contribute to these programs (Browne, 2013).”
14 Certain amount of core-resources is necessarily required to be embedded for the operation of UN 
agencies even in the voluntary funding system regardless of the preferences of donor countries 
(Graham, 2012).




Unearmarked VC Earmarked VC
Core Resources Core Resources Non-core Resources
Source: Compiled by author
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UN and non-core resources share some commonality with earmarked resources and voluntary 
contribution in the entire UN system.
In relations with multi-bi ODA, non-core resources can be also replaced by ‘multi-bi 
ODA’ since multi-bi ODA is used as resources for direct cost of developmental activities. 
Non-core resources are also earmarked for specified areas of resource disbursement which 
are the same as multi-bi ODA and both terminologies are often used for the same item in the 
United Nations. Regarding the terminologies of core and non-core resources, they are named 
differently in respective UN agencies and they can be categorized as Table 2 (United Nations, 
2012).
Significantly, there has been expansion of non-core resources (also referred to as multi-bi 
ODA) in the United Nations over the past decades, and abrupt growth of non-core resources 
was particularly made in the era of MDGs as described in Figure 3. The increase of non-
core resources implies that donor countries have come to prefer non-core resources to core 
resources for their resource contribution to the United Nations and this made an influence 
on the emergence of multi-bi ODA as well (OECD, 2013). With regard to the preference 
of donor countries for non-core resources, this has particular relations with the changed 
perceptions of donor countries towards the United Nations. This can be backed up by the 
continued decrease of ODA/GNI of the United States – largest donor to the UN system 
– towards the United Nations. The decrease of ODA contribution by the United States 
resulted from its favourability towards non-core resources as well as its changed perception 
toward the United Nations. The United States preferred to earmark their ODA contribution 
for certain areas (i.e. theme, country, region) from its initial ODA commitment to actual 
disbursement. Hence, this also made an influence on the other donor countries and expansion 
of non-core resources was followed in the entire UN system as a result (Graham, 2012). 
Table 3. Different Terms Used in UN Agencies for Core and Non-Core Resources
Core Entity Non-core (Multi-Bi) Entity
Regular Resources UNDP, UNIFEM, 
UNICEF, UNFPA




WFP Directed Multilateral 
Contribution
WFP
Regular Budget UNRWA, UNDESA, 
UN-HABITAT,





UNHCR, OCHA, IFAD, 
OHCHR
Earmarked Contribution OCHA, UNEP, UN-
HABITAT, OHCHR
Core Resources UNAIDS, OECD/DAC Extra-budgetary 
Contribution
FAO, IAEA, ILO, 
UNESCO,
General Purpose Fund unodc Special Purpose Fund unodc





Source: Compiled by author based on United Nations (2012: 52-53)
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Figure 3. Growth of Non-Core Resources in UN Agencies (1995-2010)15
4. CONFLICT OF INTEREST OVER MULTI-BI ODA
Along with the growth of non-core resources in the United Nations, donor countries and 
UN agencies have gradually faced increasing conflict of interest between them when their 
interests are not compatible in the operation of non-core resources.16 The conflict of interest 
is caused when donor countries and multilateral organizations – which include UN agencies 
– encounter diverging interest between the two sides over the use of multi-bi ODA. This is 
backed by the cases of trust funds in operation in that trust funds belong to an aid modality 
of multi-bi ODA by the definition of OECD (OECD, 2011a). For instance, the Republic 
of Korea has been strengthening the monitoring process on the operation of Korean Trust 
Funds contributed to UNESCO by increasing the numbers of inter-organizational meetings 
and dialogues between the two sides. It includes increasing the numbers of monitoring-
related publications by the Korean side as the amount of Korean trust funds have gradually 
expanded.17
Since 2010,18 Korean government and UNESCO have been holding annual ‘Review & 
Monitoring Meetings’ on Korean trust funds to UNESCO in the presence of stakeholders 
15 Regarding the activities of development, they are termed ‘Operational Activities for Development 
(OAD)’ in the United Nations and the breakdown of OAD is represented by the focus on development 
and humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2012). Most importantly, the main activities of the 
United Nations lie in the areas of development (63%) and non-core resources (multi-bi ODA) take 
up the majority (74%) out of the overall funding (United Nations, 2012). The development-focused 
nature of the United Nations became one of the reasons why this study selected the UN among 
hundreds of multilaterals for further study and analysis.
16 Referred to the articles from the United Nations, 1) https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gaef3408.doc.
htm, 2) https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gaef3424.doc.htm.
17 Korean trust funds (also referred to as KFIT; Korean Fund in Trust) to UNESCO approximately 
amount to 26 million USD (36 trust funds) according to the Ministry of Education.
18 Korea joined the OECD DAC as the 24th member country.
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from policy and working levels in both sides.19 In particular, the meeting has gained more 
importance for the Korean side since the Korean government has sought to increase its 
intervention in the process of fund management and operation as the fund size becomes 
larger. The Korean Ministry of Education has also endeavoured to maintain its control over 
the trust funds by dispatching a fund manager to UNESCO Headquarter and Korean National 
Commission for UNESCO.20 This is because Korean trust funds contributing to UNESCO 
on education have doubled from 2.4 million USD to 4.4 million USD and the number of 
trust funds was also expanded from 2 to 6 between 2013 and 2016 (according to the internal 
documents of the Ministry of Education).21 Along with the expansion of Korean trust funds 
to UNESCO, the need for result-oriented fund management and tighter monitoring on fund 
operation has also increased for the Korean side. 
Likewise, UNESCO also tends to leverage its stance over the trust fund to make it more 
advantageous for the benefit of the organization even though UNESCO simultaneously seeks 
to cooperate with the Ministry. However, the leveraging efforts of UNESCO to increase its 
stance face many limitations in reality since the organization has gone through deepening 
financial risks due to growing conflict of interest with traditional big donor countries such 
as the U.S. and Japan in recent years. Compared to UNESCO, the case of World Bank 
shows the leveraging efforts of multilateral organization against donor countries can 
work out in practice. Unlike UNESCO, the World Bank does not allow donor countries to 
dispatch a person to the Bank as a seconded fund manager in the aim of fund monitoring 
and management. Since 2010, World Bank has been transforming the trust fund operation 
system into recipient-driven one to maximize the benefits of recipient countries and minimize 
the interests of donor countries (World Bank, 2011). It is evident that the financial status of 
World Bank is much more robust and stable than UNESCO since the U.S. heavily supports 
the Bank in financial terms. This makes the difference between UNESCO and World Bank 
on how multilateral organizations can behave in order them to escalate their interests against 
donor countries.
 To sum up, the relationship between donor countries and multilateral organizations 
can be either cooperative or competitive according to the features of their mutual interests 
since the respective interest of donor countries and multilateral organizations cannot always 
lie on the same side in multi-bi ODA. However, the relationship of either cooperation or 
competition can be affected by the financial factors in reality.
This also implies that the continuous expansion of non-core resources (multi-bi ODA) in 
the United Nations – as shown in Figure 3 – may drive the two stakeholders (donor countries 
and multilateral organizations) into larger chances of conflict of interest when they do not 
agree on the operation of multi-bi ODA. Interestingly, dependence on non-core resources 
(multi-bi ODA) was found to be the highest in the UN agencies which belongs to ‘UN Funds 
and Programmes’ as shown in the Table 4. It is estimated that this originates from the fact that 
19 These monitoring meetings have been annually organized between Seoul and Bangkok (UNESCO) 
in turn.
20 In 2017, UNESCO hired a seconded Korean trust fund manager at the UNESCO Headquarter for the 
purpose of fund monitoring and cooperation with the Korean government.
21 Korean trust funds to UNESCO targeted on education are largely ranged from TVET (Technical and 
Vocational Education and Training), higher education and GCE (Global Citizenship Education) on 
curriculum development, teacher training and provision of equipment & facilities according to the 
Ministry of Education.
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the UN agencies in the Funds and Programmes heavily rely on voluntary contribution which 
is mostly composed of non-core resources; multi-bi ODA (OECD 2010a; 2011a; 2012).
Significantly, the dependence on non-core resources (multi-bi ODA) has relations with 
the gradual decrease of revenues in the United Nations over the past decades. The declining 
revenues in the United Nations were initially derived from economic downturn which 
was once globally prevalent in the 1990s and this led to the weakening of advantageous 
positioning of UN agencies over donor countries. To overcome the decrease of revenue in 
the United Nations, the UN General Assembly tried to direct the governing bodies of the UN 
agencies – such as UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP – to develop achievable and specific targets 
for additional resource mobilization to make the operation of the United Nations financially 
more stable and sustainable (United Nations, 2007). Accordingly, this made an influence on 
the emergence of multi-bi ODA and the gradual increase of non-core resources in the United 
Nations. 
With regard to the conflict of interest between donor countries and multilateral countries, 
the expansion of multi-bi ODA in the United Nations has relevant implications since it can 
increase the additionality of revenues in the United Nations. In particular, this intertwined 
relationship in multi-bi ODA can be best explained by the theories of Principal Agent Model 
(PA Model) due to the similar structures of conflict of interest in both sides.
Table 4. Share of non-Core Resources in the United Nations and Other Multilateral Organizations
Organization Core Resources Non-Core Resources
Non-Core Share of Overall 
Funding
EU 13120 420 3%
World Bank Group 10352 4002 28%
UN Funds and Programmes 3319 8759 73%
UNDP 1001 2160 68%
WFP 381 2895 88%
UNICEF 685 1572 70%
UNFPA 466 343 42%
UNRWA 335 410 55%
Other UN 1519 2913 66%
ILo 190 148 44%
OHCHR 48 25 35%
UNESCO 158 65 29%
WHO 401 731 65%
Regional Development Banks
AfDB 2052 243 11%
ADB 1617 256 14%
Source: Compiled by author based on United Nations (2013: 8)
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5. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
5.1. Why Do Conflicts Arise in Multi-Bi ODA?
In multi-bi ODA, the relation of conflict between a donor country and a multilateral 
organization (hereinafter referred to as DC-MO relations) can be theoretically analyzed based 
on Principal Agent Model (PA model).22 It is because the structures of PA model can best 
explain the DC-MO relation (hereinafter abbreviated as ① DC = Donor Country, ② MO = 
Multilateral Organization) of multi-bi ODA since Principal and Agent can be respectively 
replaced by DC and MO due to the structural similarity of multi-bi ODA and PA Model 
(Milner and Tingley, 2010). 
As shown in Figure 4, DC and MO cooperate on multi-bi ODA and the cooperation 
entails the fact that DC (Principals, P) will hire MO (Agents, A) to delegate its authority to 
the specialized MOs (agents). However, it was proven that this cooperation inevitably entails 
some degree of conflict in the DC-MO relations as the case studies conducted in Chapter 4. 
This has an implication that balanced DC-MO relation can be either distorted or broken 
by the increasing intervention of DC even after the act of delegation. Undoubtedly, MO can 
be unfavorable toward the cooperation with the DC as a counter response (Hawkins, et al., 
2006). United States and UNESCO can be the exemplary case for this conflict relation since 
they have struggled over the mandates of contributed finance to the organization. Particularly, 
the United States has sought to maintain its strong voice over the UNESCO by controlling 
the finance which had been heavily contributed by it and the conflict relation between the two 
sides resulted in the separation of ties in the end.23 
22 The Principal-Agent Model (or theory) was originally developed in other areas of social sciences, 
economics, and the study of American and comparative politics (Hawkins, et al., 2006).
23 In 2017, the United States even terminated its status of member country in the UNESCO and 
UNESCO lost the largest donor to the organization as a result. 
Figure 4. Description of PA Model
Source: Compiled by author based on Hawkins, et al. (2006)
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According to the PA model, this shift of DC’s authority to MO can be termed ‘delegation 
relationship’ since DC (principal delegates its part of tasks and authorities to MO (agent) and 
allow MO (agent) act independently as a result (Vaubel, 2006; Nielson and Tierney, 2006; 
Groenedijk, 1997; Oestreich, 2012). Based on the qualitative analysis, it was proven that the 
conflict of interest in the DC-MO relation has a high tendency to arise when the two parties 
respond to a different set of incentives and DC knows more than MO resulting in asymmetric 
structures of information between the two sides. Second, the conflict can also arise when the 
DC falls short of sufficient skills (or experiences), and in turn, the MO has a professional 
advantage over the DC. Third, the fact that a donor country might lose a supremacy over 
multi-bi ODA originating from the delegation relationship also affects the increase of conflict. 
After all, the MO will try to balance the power relation with the DC and the possibility of 
MO’s moral hazard (also referred to as cheating) might increase as explained by PA model. 
However, actual cases of MO’s moral hazard in multi-bi ODA is believed to far less happen 
in practice since the specific mandates of multi-bi ODA are agreed upon between the DC and 
MO in advance.
5.2. Types of PA Model in Relations with DC-MO Relation 
Along with the increase of multilateral cooperation and expansion of multi-bi ODA, the 
DC-MO relation has also diversified over the past decades. Based on the qualitative analysis, 
it was a significant finding that the DC-MO relation can be classified by either single DC 
(principal) or multi DCs (principals) as described in Figure 5 and this becomes the very 
different point of multi-bi ODA in comparison with the ordinary PA model (OECD, 2012). 
In the DC-MO relations, the simplest description is represented by the ‘Single Principal 
Model’ as the Figure 4, which involves a single donor and a single agent. However, if more 
than a single principal are added in the DC-MO relations,24 PA explanations become more 
complex. Typically, principals are regarded as more complex entities than agents and this 
brings about the diversification of the PA model. According to the PA model, the relations of 
24 A recent paper concluded that “a delegation relationship can have one or more principals, and a 
principal can either be an individual or a corporate entity containing more than one individual (Lyne, 
et al., 2006).”
Figure 5. Different Types of PA Model in Relation with DC-MO Relation
Source: Compiled by author based on Hawkins, et al. (2006)
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DC (principal) and MO (agent) can be sub-categorized into three different types as: 1) single-
principal, 2) collective-principal, and 3) multiple-principal types as shown in Figure 5 (Lyne, 
et al., 2006). 
First, the Collective Principal Model can be explained by the cases of the United 
Nations and the OECD. In those organizations, member states normally make collective 
decisions by a majority on issues about fund operations, setting up strategies, and facilitating 
developmental programmes/projects. That is, the principals are not the independent actors 
in this model (collective-principal) and there is just a single contract between the agent and 
collective principals. This means that the principals delegate their authorities and tasks to an 
agent by collective decisions (Hawkins, et al., 2006).
Second, in comparison with the Collective Principal Model, the aid frameworks of multi-
bi ODA is best explained by the Multiple Principal Model since multi-bi ODA is operated 
based on multiple decision making process. In other words, each donor country is given an 
individual authority when determining the operational directions of its funding in multi-bi 
ODA (United Nations, 2007). That is, the Multiple Principal Model also has an implication 
for the United Nations since each member state in the United Nations – in addition to its 
collective actions and responsibilities – is occasionally empowered to independently decide 
its mandates based on multiple decision making processes which are often observed in the 
United Nations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
5.3. Bilateralization of Multilateral ODA or Multilateralization of Bilateral ODA?
Based on the PA model and case studies on the United Nations, the reason why conflict of 
interest between DC and MO arises in multi-bi ODA was examined in the previous chapter. 
Most significantly, it was proven that DC tries to control MO, and vice versa, MO also 
tries to strengthen its self-protective measures as a counter response to balance the DC-MO 
hegemonic relations in multi-bi ODA. In particular, this study found out that the intervention 
of DC (termed ‘control mechanisms’ of principals by PA model) primarily appears in the 
forms of 1) monitoring and evaluation, 2) rules and sanctions and 3) screening and selection 
procedures (Hawkins, et al., 2006). Specifically, these findings have substantial implications 
to this study in that the mentioned 3 forms of DC’s interventions trigger DC-MO conflict 
relations as previously investigated.
In this sense, this study focused on the conflict relations between DC and MO and 
conceptualized the key characteristics of conflict relations based on the proximity of multi-bi 
ODA towards either multilateral ODA or bilateral ODA in comparative terms. This was very 
interesting since the term – multi-bi ODA – will have to be frequently renamed into ‘bi-multi 
ODA (calculated as multilateral ODA)’ if the so-called multi-bi ODA is estimated as being 
actually closer to multilateral ODA in practice. As a result, this study specified the conflict-
affected multi-bi ODA into two categorizations; ① ‘bilateralization of multilateral ODA 
(BMO)’ and ② ‘multilateralization of bilateral ODA (MBO)’ taking the DC’s interventions 
and MO’s self-protective measures into consideration as well. Significantly, this was analyzed 
by literature reviews ( mainly academic journals, ③ document reviews of donor agencies, 
UN agencies and other developmental organizations and ④ OECD statistics), interviews 
(UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, JICA, USAID, DFID, and DFAT) and theoretical investigation. 
The analysis was particularly conducted focusing on the UN agencies and donor countries 
in which multi-bi ODA has been actively operated in large volumes compared to other 
organizations and countries. 
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First, bilateralization of multilateral ODA (BMO) frequently appeared when DC expands 
its contribution of non-core resources to the United Nations and excess of voluntary 
contribution over assessed contribution to the United Nations takes place since both cases can 
be an effective tool of control mechanism for donor countries. In line with this, the United 
States can be a good example since the United States, which contributes the largest amount of 
ODA to the United Nations, has doubled its contribution of non-core resources to the United 
Nations in the aim of increasing its influence on the organization while gradually reducing its 
assessed contribution to the organization. This eventually resulted in the decrease of revenues 
in the UN and shortage of operational budgets in the organization which simultaneously 
strengthened voices of the United States over the UN agencies (Graham, 2012).
Likewise, it is highly anticipated that the Republic of Korea will confront a conflict 
relation with multilateral organization in the coming years since it has been increasing the 
volumes of multi-bi ODA (mainly trust funds, referred to as KFIT; Korean Funds-in-Trusts) 
since 2010 when it joined the OECD DAC as the 24th member country. Nevertheless, the 
Republic of Korea has not developed specified guidelines for the operational plan of multi-bi 
ODA unlike the donor countries such as the U.K., the U.S., Canada and Australia which have 
been operating multi-bi ODA in large volumes. This study found that the countries heavily 
dependent on multi-bi ODA have specific laws, guidelines and operational plans for multi-
ti ODA which clarified the roles of DC and MO lessening the possibility of clash of DC-MO 
interest and moral hazard of MO throughout the operational process of multi-bi ODA. Thus, 
the operational status of multi-bi ODA in the Republic of Korea can be defined as transition 
period moving toward bilateralization of multilateral ODA (BMO).
On the contrary, multilateralization of bilateral ODA (MBO) appeared when MO builds 
up its self-protective measures against DC’s increasing interventions mainly arising from 
the DC’s concerns about MO’s moral hazard (cheating). This particularly took place when 
DC’s interventions go beyond MO’s expectation and MO’s professional expertise as well 
as informational supremacy outweighs that of DC (Sagasti, 2005). Significantly, this study 
found that MO (UN agencies) tries to minimize the interventions of DC. The case of the 
World Bank previously explained in Chapter 4 can best explain the MBO in that the MO 
can protect itself by rejecting the seconded fund manager from DC to be stationed in MO. In 
general, multilateral development banks – which are more stable and robust in financial terms 
than the UN agencies – such as the World Bank, the IDB (Inter-American Development 
Bank) and the AfDB (African Development Bank) belong to the same side as the case of 
World Bank (i.e. no allowance of a DC fund manager’s stationing at the bank). However, 
those efforts in UN agencies these days have turned out to be not really successful since the 
voices of DC have been continuously strengthened due to the gradual expansion of non-
core resources in the UN as previously analyzed. To sum up, multi-bi ODA holds a unique 
position in its DC-MO conflict relation and both ‘bilateralization of multilateral ODA’ and 
‘multilateralization of bilateral ODA’ stand for the key features of multi-bi ODA. Besides, 
in terms of DC’s financial influence, multi-bi ODA can also encompass recipient countries 
as well and the triangular relationship among donor countries, multilateral organizations and 
recipient countries can be described as Figure 6. In line with MDGs and SDGs, this has a 
particular implication to the donor countries, UN agencies and international communities on 
development since the voices of donor countries have been escalating due to the expansion 
of rather donor-driven development financing such as non-core resources, voluntary 
contribution, earmarked contribution and multi-bi ODA as previously investigated. This calls 
for further discussion and continued research on how international community can make 
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development reciprocally beneficial based on cooperative partnership in the coming years. 
   
5.4. Statistical Review of Multi-Bi ODA and Its Implication
Below is the table which shows the average amount of multi-bi ODA contributed by DAC 
member countries during the recent years of MDGs (between 2007 and 2015) and the OECD 
CRS data was used for analysis. Significantly, the largest donor countries in terms of ODA 
contribution – such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia – were 
proven to be highly dependent on multi-bi ODA as well as a few Scandinavian countries25. 
This supports the argument that donor countries have a tendency to prefer earmarked multi-
bi ODA contribution to ordinary multilateral ODA while contributing their bilateral ODA 
through multilateral channels as analyzed by the PA model in previous chapter. 
Interestingly, the amount of multi-bi ODA contributed by the Republic of Korea has 
gradually increased even though the other figures such as absolute size of ODA contribution 
and ODA/GNI were way behind than those of the other countries at the list. The absolute size 
of multi-bi ODA of Republic of Korea in 2015 expanded by 10 times compared to that of 
2007. This is backed by the recent trend of increasing numbers and absolute size of diverse 
trust funds contributed by Republic of Korea as the Government of Korea has been stressing 
the need for increasing aid visibility, project outcomes, and transparent ODA monitoring 
system over the past few years. Not only has Republic of Korea been increasing the size of 
multi-bi ODA, but other donor countries has also increased multi-bi ODA as the interactions 
among countries increase. In particular, this reflects the shifting trend of ODA due to the 
conflicting interests between donor countries and multilateral organizations as analyzed by 
the PA model in this study. For instance, France increased the size of multi-bi ODA by 17 
times from 6.57 to 113.23 and Japan increased from 378.52 to 1,662.46 (2007-2015, USD 
25 ODA/GNI was over 1.00 in both Sweden and Norway and the ratio is one of the highest among all 
the DAC member countries. 
Figure 6. Shift of DC’s Influence by Either Bilateralization or Multilateralization
Source: Compiled by author
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Million).26
Considering the features of multi-bi ODA as analyzed in this study, different aspects of 
principals (DC) and agents (MO) towards multi-bi ODA was categorized as the Table 6 and 
the description was based on the PA model.
26 Germany (203.50  1035.91), Denmark (70.38  367.97), Switzerland (162.20  626.96)
Table 5. Donor Countries Highly Depending on Multi-Bi ODA (2007-2015)
Unit: USD Million







Norway 40,647 31,080 9,567 1.00 9,609 23.64%
Canada 42,662 31,492 11,170 0.30 9,623 22.55%
Australia 35,317 29,769 5,549 0.32 7,159 20.27%
U.K. 129,130 78,960 50,169 0.57 25,405 19.67%
U.S.A. 263,678 226,684 36,994 0.19 40,024 15.17%
Sweden 48,145 32,390 15,754 1.06 7,047 14.64%
Netherlands 54,601 39,513 15,087 0.75 7,738 14.17%
Finland 11,854 7,003 4,851 0.52 1,856 15.66%
Ireland 8,523 5,665 2,858 0.48 1,216 14.26%
Korea 11,937 8,858 3,079 0.11 867 7.26%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Korea 16.14 43.61 49.67 45.21 80.60 129.82 152.77 167.00 182.41
Source: Compiled by author based on the data from OECD CRS




1.  Prevent diversion of ODA and corruption 
in MOs
2.  Fund activities visible to the public in 
donor countries
1. Some concerns about diversion of ODA




1.  Support stable funding and achieving 
tangible results
2.  Escalate predictability in aid allocation and 
budget plans
1. Limit the roles of MOs
2. Lead to inflexibility of budgets 
3. Lead to a misallocation of ODA
Source: Compiled by author
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6. CONCLUSION
In line with the nature of multi-bi ODA, this paper has sought to analyze the reason why 
conflict of interest occurs in multi-bi ODA. For analysis, key characteristics of multi-bi ODA 
such as ‘multilateralization of bilateral ODA (MBO)’ and ‘bilateralization of multilateral 
ODA (BMO)’ were theoretically studied based on the PA model. This was further explained 
by the cases of World Bank, UNESCO, U.S. and Korea. Interestingly, the BMO of Korea 
turned out to the strengthening the monitoring on multi-bi ODA while the BMO of the 
U.S. was based on the large-scale of fund contribution itself. The difference came from the 
different volumes of fund contribution of donor countries leading to the differentiation of 
types of control mechanisms.
On the contrary, the degree of MBO also turned out to be not identical between World 
Bank and UNESCO since the financial stability of the organizations was different.
In light of betterment of multi-bi ODA frameworks, if the conflict between donor 
countries and multilateral organizations is an unavoidable trend as analyzed by the PA model, 
donor countries and multilateral organizations are required to make an effort to minimize the 
chances of that conflict of interest between them, and at the same time, they need to make an 
endeavour to maximize the interests of both sides for aid effectiveness and better outcomes 
of their multi-bi projects and programmes in recipient countries. In fact, both donor countries 
and multilateral organizations can benefit from control mechanisms when the mandates and 
responsibilities of both donor countries and multilateral organizations are clearly demarcated 
by mutual agreement and binding regulations as the guideline of multi-bi ODA of DFAT 
(formerly referred to as AusAID). 
On the other hand, control mechanisms of donor countries left some problems because 
installing control mechanisms in multi-bi ODA frameworks can be very challenging and 
costly for donor countries since the numbers of multilateral organizations are over two 
hundreds, and in addition, the fragmented systems in the United Nations can restrain donor 
countries from installing control mechanisms to supervise multilateral organizations.
From another PA perspective, the findings in this study could also imply that multilateral 
organizations may face difficulties in resource mobilization once the trust-based relationship 
is broken between donor countries and multilateral organizations. This can be explained by 
the case of UNESCO which has difficulties in mobilizing sufficient amount of development 
financing since the US – previously biggest donor to the UNESCO – has decided to cut back 
on its contribution to the UNESCO.
Furthermore, large volumes of ODA contribution are made by just a few donor countries. 
For example, the United States has been constantly ranked as the largest donor country by 
the size of its ODA contribution, with ODA levels averaging almost US$30 billion a year 
between 2009 and 2011, and other four countries – Germany, United Kingdom, France, and 
Japan – have averaged more than US$10 billion a year over this period. Surprisingly, the 
ODA contribution of these five countries accounts for about two‐thirds of total ODA and the 
top 15 donor countries constituted 95% of total ODA between 2009 and 2011. 
Most importantly, this implies that multilateral organizations may face a difficulty 
in resource mobilization once the trust-based relationship is broken with major donor 
countries.27 Nonetheless, this paper has proven that multi-bi ODA has some positive aspects 
27 Along with these concerns, ‘Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing for Development’ was 
18 CHONG-SUP KIM AND KI-SEOK LEE
which need to be highlighted even though it is earmarked by donor countries for certain 
subjects (countries, regions, sectors, and themes) for its disbursement in recipient countries. 
Most of all, multi-bi ODA could provide a breakthrough to many multilateral 
organizations that are going through severe budget constraints in recent years since it 
increases the additionality of development financing as explained. This additionality of 
multi-bi ODA comes from the preferences of donor countries to constrain multilateral 
organizations since donor countries seek to have their ODA contributions used in the 
areas in which they can escalate aid visibility on transparent basis.. Of course multilateral 
organizations are further constrained by the earmarking of donor countries on their ODA 
contribution compared to the cases of multilateral aid but multilateral organizations can 
benefit from the additional ODA contribution of donor countries as shown by the increase 
of voluntary contribution in the United Nations. In sum, multi-bi ODA is like a two-edged 
sword for donor countries and multilateral organizations according to different conditions 
but multi-bi ODA can also best contribute to the expansion of development financing due to 
the nature of additionality of itself. In this sense, multi-bi ODA gains its significance for the 
sustainable development in financial terms and donor countries and multilateral organizations 
are required to cooperate even though the cooperation inevitably entails some degree of 
competition.
Lastly, multi-bi ODA - earmarked funding - has to be re-evaluated and further studied 
since multi-bi ODA has only recently emerged and it has come to draw attentions from 
development societies because of its additional nature as a development financing (OECD, 
2013). Moreover, multi-bi ODA has many facets that have not yet been explored, and as 
a result, there is a clear need and strong motivation for donor countries and multilateral 
organizations – the key stakeholders in multi-bi aid frameworks - in unveiling the underlying 
impacts and possibilities of multi-bi ODA by analytical methods that can make their efforts 
to be more accountable to sustainable development in the years of SDGs.28
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